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1Overtakable capitalist growth paths
1 Introduction
Where production is organized for proﬁt, proﬁtability directs the evolution of production
technology. In this paper I argue that typical paths of proﬁt-directed technical progress,
though certainly progressive, are in one respect less progressive than some other socially
accessible paths. Comparing the development of a stylized capitalist economy with a
counterfactual in which decentralized innovation decisions are governed by a distinct set of
property relations, I claim that if the two systems are seeded with the same initial
technology and capital stocks, there’s a time T such that the capitalist economy delivers at
each date after T less consumption per person than is aﬀorded at that date on the
counterfactual.
This argument turns on the duality of wage-proﬁt and consumption-growth relations in
systems of production by means of labor and produced inputs.1 By bringing this duality
to bear on problems of ongoing technical change the paper shows that its interest extends
beyond the better-studied issue of the one-shot choice of technique. Productive change is
actually ongoing in capitalist economies, and the technical change mechanism that I
discuss is a promising source of explanations for its historical proﬁle, so I’m led to ask
what that mechanism implies for the evaluation of our capitalist future. The paper isolates
one way in which to pose this question and answers it by showing that people might do
better to choose a diﬀerent future.
1The choice of technique is studied in light of that duality in Burmeister and Kuga (1970), von Weizs¨ acker
(1971), and Roemer (1977).
22 Innovation directed by proﬁtability
Consider a population of capitalists who hire labor and tie up nondepreciating stocks of a
single good to produce more of that good. Time is continuous, and at any time t each
capitalist runs a production activity described by a couple (ρ(t),x(t)), deﬁned so that if
k(t)a n dl(t) are the stock of the good committed and the ﬂow of labor employed, the
activity yields a ﬂow of the good equal to
min(ρ(t)k(t),x(t)l(t)).
Every capitalist can employ any amount of labor at a wage w(t). Holding k(t)s h e
maximizes proﬁts by hiring [ρ(t)/x(t)]k(t)s ot h a ts h et a k e s
r(t)=ρ(t)[1− w(t)/x(t)] (1)
as the proﬁtr a t eo nh e rs t o c k .
To collapse the population distribution of capitalists’ technologies, I assume that all the
capitalists follow the same rules for innovation and that they all start from a common
technology. These assumptions allow me to reason about population aggregates by
considering what happens to a single capitalist.
In particular I suppose that at every moment t each capitalist’s operated activity obeys
˙ ρ(t)=χ(t)ρ(t)a n d˙ x(t)=γ (t)x(t)( 2 )




(χ,γ) ∈ <2 |γ ≤ g(χ)
ª
deﬁned by a twice-diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing, strictly concave g.W r i t i n gt h ewage
share as ω(t) ≡ w(t)/x(t) you have from (1) that for any ω ∈ (0,1) the capitalist can
maximize the instantaneous change in her proﬁt rate by picking (χ,γ)i nI to maximize
˙ r = ρ[(1 − ω)χ + ωγ], (3)
a problem whose unique solution, characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
ωg0 (χ)+1− ω =0 , (4)
can be represented by diﬀerentiable, respectively strictly decreasing and strictly increasing
functions of the wage share (χ(ω),γ (ω)).
Due in its outlines to Kennedy (1965) and lately revived by Dum´ enil and L´ evy (1995,
2003), Funk (2002), Acemoglu (2002), Foley (2003), and Julius (2005), this idealization of
the innovation process gives pure expression to the idea that proﬁtability acts as a social
ﬁlter on technical change, selecting its tendential bias between labor and capital. I’m going
to consider the resulting direction of productive change from a social point of view that I’ll
introduce in the next section.
43 Innovation to raise average consumption
If all the capitalists operate the activity (ρ(t),x(t)) while building up their stocks
according to
˙ k(t)=g (t)k(t), (5)
their investment per employed worker is [x(t)/ρ(t)]g (t), which leaves
c(t)=x(t)[1− g(t)/ρ(t)] (6)
as the ratio of aggregate consumption to employed labor. By rearranging this relation
between growth rates and per-worker consumption as
g (t)=ρ(t)[1− c(t)/x(t)] (7)
you ﬁnd that it’s identical to the relation between proﬁt and wage rates (1) pointed out in
the last section.
A simple thought experiment will bring out the importance of this duality. Suppose that
the human population of this economy, N (t), expands as in
N (t)=N0ent. (8)
And suppose that production will be locked into the activity that emerges from a period of
technical progress directed by a benevolent engineer. If the economy with its eventually
stationary technology is to maintain a constant ratio of employed workers to its total
population, the stocks available to production must also eventually grow at the
proportional rate n. Let the engineer choose a direction of technical change to maximize,
5at each moment, the rate of change of the level of consumption per capita that can be





the engineer selects a (χ(t),γ (t)) in I to maximize
˙ c = x[µnχ +( 1− µn)γ].
The innovation that solves this problem can be written as (χ(1 − µn),γ (1 − µn)) using
the same functions that characterize the capitalists’ decisions of section 1. It follows that
the proﬁt- and consumption-minded rules induce the same proﬁle of technical change if
and only if r(t)=n so that the going shares of proﬁts and wages (1 − ω(t),ω(t)) weigh
the two components of innovation proportionally to the investment and consumption
shares (µn (t),1 − µn (t)). If the capitalists are to mimic the friendly engineer, distribution
must respect “the golden rule” of Allais, Desrousseaux, Phelps, Robinson, Swan, and von
Weizs¨ acker.
4 Long-run neutralization of technical change
To this point I have only reworked in diﬀerential form some old ideas about a one-time
discrete choice of activity. But I had promised to evaluate trajectories of ongoing technical
change. This requires that I ﬁrst complete the model of section 2 with explicit dynamics
for the wage and for capital accumulation.





so that the wage share evolves according to
˙ ω = ω[ψ(υ) − γ (ω)] (9)
for some ψ(υ)t h a th a sψ
0 (υ) > 0. If wages are entirely consumed, if each capitalist saves
her proﬁts in a constant proportion s, and if the population N (t)g r o w sl i k e( 8 ), the
employment ratio obeys
˙ υ = υ[s(1 − ω)ρ + χ(ω) − γ (ω) − n]( 1 0 )
while the augmentation of capital in technical change is governed by
˙ ρ = χ(ω)ρ. (11)
T h el a w so fm o t i o n( 9 ,10,11), ﬁrst put together by Shah and Desai (1981), make a
complete dynamical system in ω,υ,ρ. It turns out that by wedding endogenously directed
technical change with the reserve-army wage-and-accumulation dynamics of Goodwin
(1967) and Marx, this model arrives at a powerful explanation of the apparent long-run
trendlessness of output-capital ratios and wage shares in growing capital economies.
To see how that goes, notice that since the boundary of the innovation set has g0 (0) < 0, a
7unique ω∗ between 0 and 1 induces Harrod-neutral technical change,
χ(ω∗)=0 . (12)
Let γ∗ ≡ γ (ω∗) be the associated rate of labor augmentation; I assume that
0 ≤ ψ
−1 (γ∗) ≤ 1. (13)
Then the ﬂow picked out by (9,10,11) has a locally asympotically stable steady state2
with: a constant employment ratio equal to ψ
−1 (γ∗); a constant wage share whose value,
ω∗, is invariant with respect to saving and population growth rates; Harrod neutral







Technical change, though it’s intrinsically two-dimensional, degenerates to Harrod
neutrality as the wage share approaches the value ω∗ that annihilates its
capital-augmenting component.
This model’s fertility as a source of explanations for the Kaldorian regularities of capitalist
growth paths invites attention to its implications for human wellbeing on those paths.
Here is one. Should you ﬁnd yourself in the capitalist steady state trying to maximize the
instantaneous rate of change of consumption per head compatible with accumulation at








2For a proof of its local stability see Shah and Desai (1981).
8to capital and labor augmentation respectively. But positive capitalist consumption, in
bounding the proﬁtr a t ea b o v eg∗, bounds the proﬁt share above the appropriate




= s(1 − ω∗) < 1 − ω∗. (15)
You can tell already that, viewed from the standpoint of social consumption, the
attracting income distribution puts too much weight on the augmentation of produced
material inputs and too little on the augmentation of labor power.
5D u e l i n g ﬁlters
To bring this conclusion home I’ll now compare the evolution of consumption per head in
this system with an explicit consumption-driven alternative. No doubt this could be done
by continuing section 3’s ﬁction of the benevolent engineer, evaluating the development of
(9,10,11) against the benchmark of the centrally promulgated solution to some Bellman or
Pontryagin problem.3 However I think a more interesting comparison is to a decentralized
economy in which innovation decisions are no better informed and no more powerfully
computed than the capitalists’ eﬀorts.
For this reason I suppose that a group of coops, whose members exhaust a population that
expands like (8), run production activities (xG(t),ρG(t)).4 At every moment the coops
hold on loan from the state a stock of means of production on which they pay interest at
3Nordhaus (1967) studies the intertemporal optimization of directed technical change.
4The thought that coops might be carriers of the golden rule was suggested by remarks in Nell (1976); von
Weizs¨ acker and Samuelson (1971) expound the regulating role of a golden interest rate in socialist planning; a
classic comparison of socialist and capitalist growth paths is Nuti (1970); and for golden-rule-based criticisms
of technologically stationary capitalism see Goodwin (1972) or Thompson (2003).
9the rate i(t); the state also taxes coops’ net income at some rate τ (t). The coop workers
consume what they produce net of these interest and tax payments, and each coop chooses
an innovation proﬁle in I to maximize the rate of change in this consumption per worker
due to innovation,





is the interest share of coop revenue. The tax drops out of this problem, and the coops’
constrained-best innovation is again described by χ(1 − µ),γ (1 − µ)w i t ht h e
consumption weight 1 − µ playing the same role in their decisions as the wage share plays
in the capitalists’ decisions. Finally I assume that the coops continually apply for, though
they might not receive, loans suﬃcient to employ all their members on their evolving
production activities and that the bank observes their aggregate demand for credit.
Again my ploy requires that I populate this counterfactual economy with maximally naive
actors, so I’ll suppose that the bank oﬃcials pursue full employment and golden
accumulation with simple rules of thumb. In particular let them control the interest rate
by a rule
˙ i = α[−χ(1 − µ)+γ (1 − µ)+n − i]i, (16)
that corrects its deviation from the growth rate of coops’ demand for loans with an
intensity of adjustment α > 0, giving rise to a diﬀerential equation for the investment
weight,
˙ µ =[ −(1 + α)χ(1 − µ)+αγ (1 − µ)+αn − αi]µ. (17)
And I assume that the bank allows the stock on loan to the coops to accumulate at the
10proportional rate i(t)+z (υ(t)) for some z (υ(t)) with z0 < 0a n dz (1) = 0, setting the
enterprise tax equal to [i(t)+z (υ(t))]/ρ(t)s ot h a ti t sn e wl o a n sa r ec o v e r e db yi t s
interest and tax revenue. Being in fact credit-rationed so long as υ < 1, the coops accept
these loans. The bank’s policy and the coops’ innovation rules together yield
˙ υ = υ[z (υ)+i + χ(1 − µ) − γ (1 − µ) − n], (18)
as a law of motion for the ratio of the employed to the total population.
Appendix A shows that the dynamical system (16,17,18) has a unique globally
asymptotically stable rest point characterized by full employment, Harrod-neutral progress
at the rate γ∗, investment that accounts for a share µ∗ =( 1− ω∗) of national spending,
and interest and acccumulation rates constant at g∗. But the system approaches this






1 − ω∗, (19)
than prevails in the capitalist long run, since it follows by comparison with (14) that if the
capitalists do any consumption at all, ρ∗
R > ρ∗
G.
I won’t pretend that the market syndicalism of (16,17,18) is an incentive-compatible,
politically stable, or otherwise attractive socialism. The Crime of Monsieur Lange
notwithstanding, I don’t intend any aﬀection for the coop form itself. I’ve only tried to
sketch a sanely informed decentralization of the social pursuit of higher consumption per
head, a foil to (9,10,1 1 )t h a td i ﬀers from it mainly in the decision rules that govern
technical progress and in the property relations that give those rules currency.
In both economies ongoing technical change permits average social consumption to
11increase forever. And the unemployment-stabilizing rate of accumulation is endogenous
rather than selected by the given path of labor supply. So I can’t ask about these
economies the question I asked in section 3; another criterion is called for. For any two
growth paths, say that one path overtakes the second if there’s a date T such that after T
per capita consumption is always strictly greater on the ﬁrst path. And for any two
economies A and B characterized by possibly distinct decision rules for innovation and
accumulation and by identical paths of labor supply and an identical innovation set, say
that A overtakes B if every growth path of B is overtaken by a growth path of A that
shares that B-path’s technology and capital stock at some date 0. I’ll now argue that the
economy (9,10,11) is indeed overtakable.
6 Overtakable capitalist growth paths
Though the nonlinearities in these systems preclude explicit comparisons of the time paths
of consumption per head starting from arbitrary initial conditions, some indirect reasoning
will establish overtaking in the most salient group of economies.
Suppose that at a time 0 a capitalist economy with s<1 has already spent some time in









eγ∗t = x0 (1 − s(1 − ω∗))eγ∗t. (20)
And consider an alternative history in which property relations are reset at 0: Coops
usurp capitalists’ role in the organization of production, and a state bank succeeds them in
control of the social surplus, setting in motion the system (16,17,18). This counterfactual
path inherits a capital stock and technology that determine an initial value for the
12employment ratio, and the new bank authorities, having observed their Harrod-neutral
capitalist prehistory, start the interest rate out at the established rate of accumulation g∗.
A glance at (16) and (17) shows that
i(t) ≤ g∗,µ(t) <µ ∗ ⇒ ˙ i(t) > 0( 2 1 )
and
i(t) >g ∗,µ(t) ≥ µ∗ ⇒ ˙ µ(t) < 0. (22)
An orbit that starts from




= sµ∗ <µ ∗, (23)
will thus have i(t) >g ∗ and µ(t) <µ ∗ throughout its approach to the rest point, so that









The consumption per worker that’s compatible with accumulation at the attracting rate
g∗,
cG (t) ≡ x(t)(1− ˘ µ(t)),
itself increases at the proportional rate
ˆ cG ≡ ˙ cG/cG =
˘ µ
1 − ˘ µ
χ(1 − µ(t)) + γ (1 − µ(t)). (25)
13From (20) and (25) it’s clear that
˘ µ(t)χ(1 − µ(t)) + [1 − ˘ µ(t)]γ (1 − µ(t)) > [1 − ˘ µ(t)]γ (1 − µ∗)
⇒ ˆ cG(t) > ˆ cR (t). (26)
And the concavity of the innovation frontier g (·) implies that for any three investment
weights µ1,µ 2,µ 3,
µ1 >µ 2 >µ 3
⇒ µ1χ(1 − µ2)+[ 1− µ1]γ (1 − µ2) >µ 1χ(1 − µ3)+[ 1− µ1]γ (1 − µ3). (27)
B u t( 2 4 )s a y st h a tµ∗,µ(t), and ˘ µ(t) satisfy the antecedent of (27), which in turn ensures
that they satisfy the antecedent of (26) and hence that ˆ cG(t) > ˆ cR (t) throughout the






and noting that ˆ cG(t) → ˆ cR (t)=γ∗ as capital augmentation dies out you get that
lim
t→∞η(t) ≡ η∗ > 1. (29)
Rates of accumulation go to g∗ in both systems, so consumption per person is
asymptotically the sustainable consumption per worker, cR (t)o rcG (t), scaled down by the
employment ratio. But that employment ratio, equal to ψ
−1 [γ∗] in the capitalist steady
state, converges to 1 in the socialist counterfactual. So the ratio of consumption levels per
person on the two paths approaches η∗/ψ
−1 [γ∗] ≥ η∗ > 1a st i m eg o e st oi n ﬁnity.
14I’ve now shown that the steady-state trajectories of capitalist economies whose capitalists
consume some of their proﬁts are overtaken by counterfactual paths formed by switching
t ot h el a w so fm o t i o n( 1 6 ,17,18). Now suppose that the rest point of (9,10,11) is globally
asymptotically stable. Then the capitalist economy is overtakable, since any one of its
orbits is overtaken by the identically initially conditioned orbit of a hypothetical economy
that makes the switch to (16,17,1 8 )a tal a t e - e n o u g hd a t e . 5
7 Late-capitalist growth and how to evaluate it
Beyond the direct conﬂict over the consumption of a given moment’s product, and the
garden-variety tradeoﬀ between current consumption and the possible future consumption
aﬀorded by savers’ accumulation of capital, this argument calls attention to a third,
speciﬁcally evolutionary axis of antagonism between capitalists’ and social interests in
consumption. If you take the empirically plausible view that capital productivity is
declining in the earlier stages of capitalist development, and if with a somewhat shakier
basis in the facts you understand the recent growth of advanced capitalist countries as
motion near the steady state of a proﬁt-directed technical change system, you will
conclude that, taxed as they are by capitalists’ consumption, those economies have settled
for Harrod neutrality and a retarded pace of labor productivity growth too soon.
This conclusion is a sort of bastard cousin of views often attributed to Marx. It’s a fully
spelled-out example of a scenario in which capitalist relations of production eventually
5Appendix B proves the last claim in the text. Since I have no proof of the global stability of (9,10,11),
the possibility remains that the system has nonconvergent paths which are not overtakable. I doubt that
this qualiﬁcation subtracts much economic interest from the current claim. For one thing, (9,10,11) only
bears consideration insofar as its orbits spend most of their time near its steady state so that the model can
recover the rough long-run constancy of wage shares and output-capital ratios. Periodic or quasiperiodic
orbits can’t be dismissed on these grounds, but simulations and bifurcation analysis have failed to detect
any in this version of the directed technical change model.
15fetter the development of the forces of production. But it describes only a relative
fettering, not an absolute stagnation, and this need not generate any endogenous pressure
for a change in production relations.6 Moreover this scenario exactly inverts the pattern of
technical change that’s supposed to bring about Marx’s falling rate of proﬁt, since, far
from being destroyed by innovation of the capital-using, labor-saving type, this system
isn’t getting enough of that kind of progress.
Though I won’t be surprised if the empirical premises of this conclusion are rejected, I
think the reasoning that leads up to it is independently interesting as an example of an
underemployed strategy for evaluating long-run growth paths and the social arrangements
that support them. The best-known procedure asks whether a path succeeds or fails in
maximizing an intertemporal social welfare function. The search for a defensible function
to be maximized leads mostly to chagrin. For example it’s not clear why future utilities
should be discounted as is required for the convergence of utility integrals on inﬁnite paths
with perpetually positive consumption. (I think it was mainly this problem that inspired
the authors of the original overtaking criterion to propose it; see for example von
Weizs¨ acker (1965).) But another diﬃculty arises where some function like that is
embraced, namely that it doesn’t tell us how to choose among the many decentralized
economies whose actors have no hope of locating, let alone deliberately approaching, its
maximum. This objection seems especially serious where the long-run development of a
technically progressive economy is concerned, since people can ﬁnd out what kinds of
technical changes are available only by going out and running their technologies, and since
they have no way of intelligibly reporting back their discoveries to a social planner.
A reader accustomed to the more familiar procedure might dismiss the arguments of this
6Miller (1981) introduces and Cohen (1987) develops this relative/absolute fettering distinction in the
context of a technologically determinist interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism.
16paper, saying “Of course your capitalism is not optimal–you don’t allow the people who
live in it to optimize intertemporally.” But since all the economies at which we might aim
will fail the test that she mentions and for the same reason, we need another test. The
alternative I’ve been trying out goes like this. Suppose that certain qualitative hypotheses
about the laws of motion under some institutional set-up are true. Can we conclude that
people unaided by any new capacity for computing and imposing social plans might
rearrange their institutions in a way that makes them roughly better oﬀ?Ac o n c l u s i o n
like that is something to keep in mind.
Appendix A: global dynamics of (16, 17, 18)
Is h o wt h a t( 1 6 ,17,18) has a unique nonzero rest point that attracts all trajectories with
strictly positive initial conditions. This system decomposes as υ(t) does not appear in
(16,17). The χ(·)t e r m si n( 1 6 ,17) vanish at µ∗, so both righthand sides are sent to zero
by µ = µ∗ and i = g∗ ≡ γ (1 − µ∗)+n. It’s readily checked from (16,17) that the isoclines






|˙ i=0 < 0( 3 0 )
everywhere, so that (µ∗,g∗) is the only interior rest point; that each isocline intersects
both coordinate axes; and that both variables are increasing (decreasing) at all interior
points below (above) their respective isoclines. Therefore the two open sets bounded by
the isoclines and one of the axes are trapping regions in which all trajectories approach
(µ∗,g∗), and every trajectory that originates in the positive orthant but outside these
trapping regions must enter one of them or approach (µ∗,g∗) directly. Therefore
µ(t),i(t) → µ∗,g∗ from any interior initial position and so by (18) ˙ υ(t)/υ(t) → z (υ(t)).
But z (υ) > 0f o rυ < 1. So υ(t) → 1, and the steady state is asymptotically stable in the
large.
17Appendix B: overtaking from arbitrary initial conditions
If the rest point of (9,10,11) is globally asymptotically stable, then for any one of its
trajectories and for ω(t0),ρR (t0)c l o s ee n o u g ht oω∗,ρ∗
R, a counterfactual with initial
conditions
i(t0)=s(1 − ω(t0))ρR (t0)( 3 1 )
µ(t0)=s(1 − ω(t0)) (32)
has by (21) and (22)
g∗ <i(t)a n dµ(t) < 1 − ω(t)
for t in (t0 + q(t0),t 0 + h(t0)) where q(t0)i st h eg r e a t e s tq such that g∗ = i(q)i ft h a t
equality is ever satisﬁed and t0 otherwise, and where h(t0) is the smallest h such that
µ(t0 + h)=1− ω(t0 + h) if that equality is anywhere satisﬁed and an arbitrarily large H







< 1 − ω(t)( 3 3 )
and so by (27)
˘ µ(t)χ(1 − µ(t)) + [1 − ˘ µ(t)]γ (1 − µ(t)) > [1 − ˘ µ(t)]γ (ω(t)) (34)
and therefore ˆ cG (t) > ˆ cR (t). Let η (t0;t0) be the ratio of sustainable socialist to capitalist
consumption per worker at t0 + t0 in the two systems, given that the change in property








(ˆ cG (t) − ˆ cR (t))dt +
Z t0
h(t0)
(ˆ cG(t) − ˆ cR (t))dt (35)
As t0 →∞ , q(t0) → 0s ot h eﬁrst term vanishes. The second term is certainly bounded
above zero. If there’s an h such that µ(t0 + h)=1− ω(t0 + h), the integrand of the third
term is made arbitrarily small by taking t0 toward inﬁnity, ensuring that for t beyond
h(t0), 1 − ω(t) is arbitrarily close to µ∗ and hence that µ(t), which can’t exceed µ∗,
remains arbitrarily close to 1 − ω(t). If instead µ(t) ≤ 1 − ω(t) forever, the third term is






, and rates of accumulation in both systems approach g∗.S ot h e r e
are T0 and T 0 such that the counterfactual formed from the capitalist economy at T0 has
greater per-capita consumption at all dates after T ≡ T0 + T0.
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